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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the dynamic between the process of Bulgaria’s 
European Union accession and the flow of Foreign Direct 
Investments to the country in its industrial base. A critical 
differentiation between speculative and non-speculative FDI is 
drawn while determining that the geographic origin of investments 
matters. Greek FDI, in particular, emerges as a major source of 
strategic regional investments in Bulgaria’s industry highlighting 
the significance of regional trade and cooperation for the long-term 
economic outlook not only for the host country but also for the region 
by enhancing the area of economic progress and development. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the accession of Bulgaria in 2007 with the second wave of the fifth 
enlargement of the European Union (EU) to the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEECs), it is time to take stock of the profound transformation 
that the states of the region have undergone since first lodging their 
applications for membership in the early 1990s. The change is nowhere more 
manifest than in the area of economic activity and development. Lingering 
criticism from the European Commission over the full attainment of political 
criteria, such as the universal application of the rule of law, the gradual 
adaptation to the institutions and the acquis communautaire of the EU and the 
parallel process of deeper integration, as well as the adequacy of administrative 
absorption capacities in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) notwithstanding, all 
of the new EU-12 member states satisfactorily fulfilled the Copenhagen 
economic criteria for accession1.  
Yet, the accomplishment of the economic criteria has come with varying 
degree of success amongst the ten CEE candidate countries. For instance, the 
                                                 
1
 European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, pp. 12-ff. 
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Visegrád group2 and the Baltic states are widely believed to have become much 
better adjusted to the application of the open market rules than Bulgaria and 
Romania. In consequence, their relative success led to better progress with 
development and economic prosperity since transition began3. On that count, 
the former are also considered more affluent than the latter. Yet, what started as 
a global financial crisis but grew into economic recession has hit the emerging 
market economies in CEE with acute harshness only some twenty years after 
they first embarked on the path of economic policy overhaul. Amongst them, 
the Baltic states (Latvia, in particular), Hungary and Poland have perished. 
Impressive GDP growth rates over the past few years were achieved in part 
through heavy borrowing from Western banks, giving them easy access to 
foreign currency denominated loans4. Now that credit lines are in halt and 
uncharacteristically high interest rates prevail, huge debt loads have 
accumulated to repay, leaving many Eastern European currencies in free fall. 
The relative ‘poverty’ of Bulgaria left its economy oblivious to the direct 
impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. Although this incidence is 
itself not an isolated case amongst the CEECs, the causality of it is in large part 
founded in the particular structure of the Bulgarian economy. The negative 
externalities of the bulk of the defaulting market instruments associated with 
various kinds of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and the over-leveraging of 
                                                 
2
 Refers to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia for the purpose of the European 
integration of those states in the 1990s. 
3
 GDP per capita in PPS, Eurostat (2009): http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do? 
tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsieb010 (site last accessed 12/08/2009) 
4
 Time Magazine, The Economic Crisis Hits Eastern Europe by Pelin Turgut, 25 February 2009 
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households and financial institutions was never a threat to a market unexposed 
to those instruments. However, the lack of a negative direct impact was offset 
by an inability at central government level to reverse the snow-balling 
repercussions which manifested themselves primarily through shortage of 
liquidity on the market as the majority foreign owned bank subsidiary system 
(second tier) tightened up the private sector lending criteria. This exacerbated 
the rise of private debt in the country5, already spurred on by the commodity 
bubble in anticipation of Bulgaria’s EU accession. The shortage of liquidity on 
the market intensified by the sharp withdrawal of foreign direct investments 
(FDI) where Bulgaria had become the most FDI reliant economy in CEE by 
2009. At the same time the current account deficit stands at more than 24% of 
GDP6 to be entirely financed by FDI capital flows.  
How to maintain development in the state under such circumstances has turned 
into the most challenging stumbling block after the last financial crisis in 
Bulgaria in 1997 and the country’s EU accession7. This posits two questions in 
respect of the analysis in the present article: (1) how effectively was Bulgaria’s 
economic transition steered during the EU pre-accession period; and (2) how 
disparate was the effect of FDI in the country? The discussion ensuing from 
these two primary questions provides some insights as to the sorts of economic 
reforms, on the one hand, and the kinds of FDI concentration, on the other, that 
is needed. If current economic reforms and FDI concentration have a consistent 
                                                 
5
 Source: Bulgarian National Bank and InvestBulgaria, 2008 
6
 Bulgarian National Bank, 2009 
7
 Bulgaria suffered a deep crisis in the banking sector in 1996-7. For more, see: Roussenova, L. (2002): 
The 1996-1997 Financial Crisis in Bulgaria, Policy Documentation Centre  
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positive impact on the national economy, this would imply that the country 
should continue to pursue similar policies aimed at attracting FDI in the future. 
 
2. The case of Bulgaria 
Although Bulgaria is the poorest of the EU-27 member states today, the low 
GDP base has allowed for robust real GDP growth rates between 2000 and 
20088. This coincided with the period of EU accession negotiations and EU 
membership. As a cumulative result of (1) projected GDP growth rates, (2) the 
lack of exposure to the direct impact of the defaulting market instruments, as 
well as (3) the EU experience that a new member’s accession is often followed 
on by a period of strong economic growth9, the overall economic contraction in 
2009 and 2010 for Bulgaria was first projected at lower rates than in many of 
the remaining EU member states10. However, as it happened, much of the 
slowdown was accounted for by a contraction in the construction sector11. This 
harmed productive capital investment which is generally considered to be the 
main drive of economic restructuring and technology diffusion12.  
In Bulgaria, a substantial part of capital investment is accrued from FDI 
inflows. This is due to the fact that the Bulgarian economy is much more 
                                                 
8
 Source: Eurostat, 2009 (Real GDP growth in Bulgaria in 2008 was one of the highest amongst the EU 
members states, behind only Romania and Slovakia)  
9
 Buch, C. and Piazolo, D. (2001): Capital and trade flows in Europe and the impact of enlargement, 
Economic Systems, Vol. 25, Issue 3, pp. 183-214, Elsevier Science B.V.  
10
 Ibid.  
11
 Anti-crisis Plan of the Confederation of Employers and Industrialists in Bulgaria, 2009 
12
 FDI and Productivity Convergence in Central and Eastern Europe: An Industry Level Investigation, 
European Central Bank, Working Paper Series No. 992/ January 2009, p. 5 
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heavily reliant on FDI capital-inflows than other CEECs, which comprise 9.9% 
of GDP per annum and rising13. Comparatively, the average share of FDI in 
GDP in the remainder of the CEECs is 3.7% (Poland: 2.2%; Romania: 5.6%; 
Slovakia: 4.1%; Slovenia: 1.2%; Hungary: 3.1%; Czech Republic: 4.4%)14. The 
gap is significant, primarily reflecting the smaller GDP of Bulgaria than that of 
other CEECs. It also highlights the greater difficulty that the state will 
experience in adjusting to a sharp withdrawal of FDI inflows that is expected to 
occur under circumstances of restricted bank lending15.  
The initial forecast by Eurostat was for a much more measured contraction of 
the Bulgarian economy over the period 2009-2010, namely in the region of -1.6 
to -0.1%. This was favourable as compared to the rest of the CEECs. However, 
the latest projections of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) foresee a sharper 
contraction at -3 to -3.5% in 2009 and at -1% in 2010. The estimate for 2009 is 
consistent with expectations for much of the CEE region. However, the forecast 
for 2010 is weaker than for some of the CEECs, such as the Czech Republic 
(0.8%), Poland (1.8%), Romania (0.5%), Slovenia (1.3%) and Slovakia (1.9%), 
which are expected to have already come out of the recession by the end of 
2009 and go into positive growth territory in 201016. Those of the CEECs 
remaining in negative growth territory in 2010, such as Hungary and the Baltic 
                                                 
13
 Source: Ministry of the Economy and Energy of the Republic of Bulgaria, Investment Policy 
Directorate, 2005. FDI in 2007 was 22.6% of GDP and in 2008, 16% of GDP according to data of the 
Bulgarian National Bank. 
14
 Ibid.  
15
 FDI in 2009 is anticipated to contract to ca. 7% of GDP, compared to 16% of GDP in 2008. (Source: 
Ministry of the Economy of Bulgaria) 
16
 Eurostat, Real GDP Growth Rate, 2000-2011 
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states, were also directly exposed to the defaulting financial market 
instruments17. Thus, the incidence of two factors in particular makes Bulgaria a 
singularly interesting case to investigate amongst the CEECs: on the one hand, 
this is the lack of exposure to the defaulting market instruments but on the 
other, the prolonged economic slowdown. Whereas in the majority of CEECs 
the incidence of the latter can be explained through the presence of the former, 
this is not the case of Bulgaria. Therefore, alternate explanations must be 
sought. 
This article suggests that the disparity in real growth outlook between Bulgaria 
and the majority of the CEECs is on account of three factors in the main: (1) an 
overreliance of the national economy on FDI; (2) a large volume of speculative 
investments in the total FDI stock that failed to generate significant absorptive 
capacities in the country’s industrial base; and (3) a faster rate of withdrawal of 
FDI inflows from the country in 2009 than first anticipated. Speculative 
investments are considered to be short-term financial flows whose impact can 
threaten market liquidity18. A distinction between speculative and non-
speculative capital flows is sometimes also drawn along a differential between 
‘non-productive’ and ‘productive’ investments, respectively19. The majority 
investments in Bulgaria went to the service and property sectors instead of 
                                                 
17László Andor, ‘Hungary’s Boomerang effect’, 28/10/2008, The Guardian;  
 ‘The Baltics in the Shadow of the Financial Crisis’, Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of 
the Sveriges Riksbank, at Intervalor and Baltic Property Trust, Stockholm, 9 September 2009   
18
 Deacon, B. (2000): Eastern European welfare states: the impact of the politics of globalization, 
Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 146-161 
19
 Salvatore, D. (2006): Currency Misalignments and Trade Asymmetries among Major Economic 
Areas, pp. 1-19, in Alexander, V. and Kotz, H.-H. (eds.): Global Divergence in Trade, Money and 
Policy, Edward Elgar Publishing  
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developing production capacity in the industrial sector. Those, in particular, 
have allowed for an accelerated rate of FDI (and remittances20) withdrawals 
from the national economy than non-speculative (strategic) such would have 
otherwise provided for. Export development was thus weak while imports 
increased rapidly as a result of strong domestic demand. 
Recent harmonised industry-level analysis by the European Central Bank 
(ECB) has shown that foreign capital, in the form of FDI inflows, plays an 
important role in accounting for productivity growth in the central and eastern 
European region21. A key conclusion of the study is that the impact of FDI on 
productivity critically depends on the host country’s capacity to absorb 
technology22. The empirical evidence further highlights the fact that FDI and 
absorptive capacity are key factors for productivity convergence in CEE. This 
favourable impact of FDI on productivity is not, however, automatic and can be 
strengthened by improving the absorptive capacity of the recipient economy23. 
Therefore, in order to draw conclusions about when FDI is good for 
development, this article first takes a critical look into the restructuring of 
Bulgaria’s industry since transition began. The following section further 
highlights the extent to which the country has developed sufficient policy 
instruments to enhance absorption capacity as a result of its recourse to pre-
accession facilities in preparation of EU membership. 
                                                 
20
 In 2003, remittances composed 49.64% of FDI (Source: Krassen Stanchev, Institute for Market 
Economics, Sofia) 
21
 FDI and Productivity Convergence in Central and Eastern Europe: An Industry Level Investigation, 
European Central Bank, Working Paper Series No. 992/ January 2009, p. 6 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid. 
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3. Industrial restructuring 
Since transition began in 1990 the industrial sector has progressively shrunk 
vis-à-vis the services sector as share of the national economy, a trend observed 
in the developed world since the 1970s24. Thus, whereas in 1991 industry 
represented 42.8% of GVA25 with services at 43%26, by 2007 industry formed 
32.3% of GVA while services accounted for 61.5%27. Although this may seem 
symptomatic of a profound reorientation of economic activity, it is important to 
note that the declining share of industry within the national economy was in 
large part accounted for by a degree of freefall, resulting from the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and the COMECON, the principal export destinations for 
Bulgarian industrial goods. In addition, inefficient and aged state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) that were viable only within the context of intra-
COMECON country trade specialisation pre-1989, added to the burden on 
industry to restructure post-1990. Notwithstanding, this was further 
compounded by a comparatively slow pace of privatization and the 
involvement of insiders who failed to incentivise the process sufficiently.  
Industrial restructuring reform post-1990 has been driven in the first instance 
by the process of European integration. To this end, it benefited from the 
following pre-accession instruments, conceptualised in this article as the direct 
                                                 
24
 Industrial Metamorphosis, The Economist, 29/09/2005 
25
 GVA represents GDP minus adjustments, which are the financial intermediation services indirectly 
measured, non-deductible value-added tax, excises and import duties. 
26
 National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, 1999 
27
 AEE, 2005; InvestBulgaria Agency, 2009 
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effect of European integration: (1) PHARE, (2) the Europe Agreements, and (3) 
Phare (initiated at the onset of enlargement to CEE). These initiatives were 
expanded on after Bulgaria’s EU accession in 2007 through the Post-Accession 
financial envelope that the new EU member states were allocated to benefit 
from in 200428. A review of these instruments in the subsequent sub-sections 
shows in greater detail the extent to which sufficient absorption capacities were 
created in industry as a result of recourse to the pre-accession funds. In turn, 
this will indicate the capacity of the restructured industrial sector to absorb 
long-term FDI capital flows.  
The empirical findings suggest that the overall direct effect of the pre-accession 
instruments is rather negligible. It finances 6-7% of the cost of Bulgaria’s 
preparation for accession29. Furthermore, the impact on the fiscal position of 
the state is believed to be negative30. The absorption capacity both at central 
government and at local government level (municipal) has remained highly 
problematic31. For instance financial absorption under the Programme 
INTERREG IIIA / PHARE CBC Greece-Bulgaria was 7.12% by the end of 
2003 due to implementation, approval and recruitment delays32.  
In consequence, the most prised contribution of the pre-accession facilities to 
the economic transformation of Bulgaria is indirect. It lies in the credibility that 
                                                 
28
 SEC (2004) 160 final, Brussels 10.2.2004 
29
 Angelov, I. (2001): Positive and Negative Effects from the Integration of Bulgaria to the European 
Union, Economic Thought, Issue 4, pp. 24-61 
30
 This article: Table 5, p. 16 
31
 Operational Programme Technical Assistance 2007-2013, Republic of Bulgaria, Ministry of Finance, 
November 2007, p. 7-ff. 
32
 ΑΞΙΟΛΟΓΗΣΗ Π.Κ.Π. INTERREG IIIA/PHARE CBC ΕΛΛΑ∆Α-ΒΟΥΛΓΑΡΙΑ, ΕΕΟ GROUP 
Α.Ε.- GLOBAL VIEW A.E. 
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they afforded the country as a prospective EU member state with the associated 
political stability and economic prosperity that the European integration 
process lends the accession-candidate. It is this indirect impact that has allowed 
the Balkan state to attract substantial FDI inflows as percentage of GDP over 
the past decade. By 2006, 22% of FDI stock in Bulgaria had gone to the 
industrial sector33. Thus, Foreign Direct Investment has had the most singularly 
significant external advantageous impact on the development of the national 
economy as a major source of liquid capital flow for second-generation 
industrial reforms that ensued following the initial privatisation offering of 
SOEs.  
In turn, these investments are differentiated between speculative and non-
speculative in order to distinguish between the short- and the long-term impact 
of FDI on the economy. In the break-down the article points to the significance 
of regional FDI that emerges from the analysis. In the case of Bulgaria, 
regional FDI is provided for by Greek capital inflows in the main. This 
incidence is both historical and logical in that regional trade can lead not only 
to bilateral but also to multilateral agreements vis-à-vis FDI34. It was only due 
to the fundamental difference of system values during the pre-transition period 
that this event never occurred prior to 1990 in South-East Europe, leaving the 
region divided and weak for many decades. Proving the importance of regional 
                                                 
33
 Bulgaria Factsheet 2006: Economy Investment, Business and Industry, InvestBulgaria Agency, 2006 
34
 This incidence is not novel within the wider European context: note the relationship between Sweden 
and the Baltic region; Germany/Austria and the Central European region, etc. See also: 
Blomström, M., Kokko, A. and Globerman, S. (1998): Regional Economic Integration and Foreign 
Direct Investment: The North American Experience, Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 
No. 269 
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co-operation, FDI in Bulgaria originating from Greece was the most significant 
single source of FDI flows to the country in the years 1996-200335. Italy, 
Austria, the Netherlands and others followed on by some distance during this 
period36. It was only by the time that Bulgaria’s EU membership looked 
increasingly certain that the primacy of Greece as geographic origin of FDI was 
gradually overtaken by the larger economies of Austria and the Netherlands. 
Greek FDI remained the overall second strongest source of foreign investments 
in the country in 200437, which also coincided with a period of robust GDP 
growth in Bulgaria38. Overall, during the period 1996-2008, FDI stock 
originating in Greece represented 9% of total investment inflows, making it the 
third largest source of FDI after the larger economies of Austria (16%) and the 
Netherlands (12%)39.  
It is, therefore, significant to point out that the logic of regional trade and 
investment helped Bulgaria spring out of its economic weakness in the first 
instance. Following the grave financial meltdown that the state suffered in 
1996-1997 the confidence in the future economic outlook of Bulgaria displayed 
by Greek businesses aided in the reforms of the country. Thus, this article 
discusses in subsequent section 4.2 at greater length the structure of Greek FDI 
in particular, due to the fact that the regional characteristics of the investments 
have more often than not contributed to their strategic quality. Concurrently, 
                                                 
35
 Source: Bulgarian National Bank and InvestBulgaria, 2009 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Source: www.bulgarianindustry.bg (site last accessed 17/08/2009) 
38
 Bulgarian National Bank, 2009 
39
 InvestBulgaria Agency, 2009 
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the foreign trade turn-over between the two countries has increased 
significantly. Greece has become Bulgaria’s third-largest trading partner, whilst 
Bulgaria, the fourth-largest trading partner of Greece40. This effect is often 
observed where export-oriented FDI capital flows go towards developing 
production capacity in the industrial sector of the host country as opposed to its 
service and property sectors41. 
 
3.1. PHARE and the Europe Agreements 
In the immediate aftermath of transition, the EC set up the PHARE programme 
as a financial tool to aid in the economic transition of Poland and Hungary (as 
the name suggested)42. It was expanded to the remainder of the CEECs after 
1990 with Council Regulation (EEC) No 2698/90 and successive such 
amending the original as the main tool to channel EC financial assistance ‘for 
economic and humanitarian aid to support the process of economic and social 
reform before the decision to commence formal membership negotiations with 
the states of the region was taken.’43 As such, PHARE had two main directions 
of impact: (1) to strengthen institutions of transition states included in the 
annex of the list of states covered by the programme; and (2) to promote 
economic and social cohesion with those states and the region. Covering 13 
                                                 
40
 Bulgarian Statistical Institute 
41
 ‘The Baltics in the Shadow of the Financial Crisis’, Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of 
the Sveriges Riksbank, at Intervalor and Baltic Property Trust, Stockholm, 9 September 2009, p. 2 
Barry, F. And Bradley, J. (1997): FDI and Trade: The Irish Host-Country Experience, The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 107, No. 445 (Nov., 1997), pp. 1798-1811. 
42
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 
43
 Ibid.  
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partner countries by 1996, the original budget of PHARE was set at ECU 4.3 
billion for the period 1990-199444.  
The advent of the PHARE programme saw a need to formalise and 
institutionalise trade relations between the EU and the states of CEE. This came 
in the form of the Europe Agreements (EAs) or Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
which provided the legal bilateral framework for interaction between the EU 
and the individual CEE state. It offered the latter certain preferential trade 
agreements with the EU area that were key incentives to trade liberalisation and 
phasing out rules on the provision of state aids in the CEECs. Seen often not as 
traditional free trade agreements, the EAs are sometimes referred to as a 
stepping-stone to EU accession45. 
Investigating the impact of the EAs over their lifeline, Spies and Marques 
(2006) have established the following results46. The overall effect on trade 
imports of the EU-15 from the CEECs was positive and growing at rates three 
times faster than the rates compared for the rest of the world (ROW)47. 
However, an econometric analysis of the import flows shows that the FTAs 
with Slovenia and the Baltic countries (except for Lithuania) were less harmful 
to the ROW than the FTAs with Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria48. This is derived as an estimate of EU imports 
                                                 
44
 Source: IBIS (http://www.ibis-eu.com/index.php/phare/ site last accessed 13/08/2009) 
45
 Phinnemore, D. (1999): Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?, Sheffield 
Academic Press 
46
 Spies, J. and Marques, H. (2006): Trade Effects of the Europe Agreements, Institut für 
Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität, Stuttgart, ISSN 0930-8334 
47
 Ibid. p. 3 
48
 Ibid. p. 5 
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over GDP ratios for the CEECs. The authors also find that the biggest growth 
of imports over GDP ratios has occurred for those countries that signed the 
FTAs soon after their transition (Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic). 
Virtually no or even negative growth was reported for the Baltic countries and 
Slovenia, who entered into the FTAs later49. In all, it is estimated that the EAs 
have generated anything in the range of 11% to 25% more trade between the 
EU and the CEECs as compared to a scenario where those agreements did not 
exist50.  
Although in terms of pure trade volumes the analysis by Spies and Marques 
should appear to hold, it seems that Bulgaria is a deviant case seen against the 
context of the hypotheses in their study. The logic that the earlier a trade 
agreement is signed, the more advantages are to be drawn from it by the 
CEECs is in the case of the Balkan state erroneous. Bulgaria had signed its EA 
(1993) before Hungary (1994), pointed as an example of an early comer in the 
Spies and Marques analysis. Nevertheless, Bulgaria continued to display worse 
macroeconomic performance throughout the 1990s than other CEECs. 
Moreover, its trade balance has remained in deficit almost uninterrupted since 
1993, widening sharply especially since 200351.  
Overall, during the pre-accession period, Bulgaria’s trade with the EU 
increased modestly. EU imports from the country have moved from ECU 1.013 
                                                 
49
 Ibid. p. 5 
50
 See also Hanson, B.T. (2003): What happened to fortress Europe? External Trade Policy 
Liberalization in the European Union, International Organization, 52:55-85 
51
 Source: InvestBulgaria, 2009 
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million through to ECU 1.835 million in 1995 to Euro 3.062 million in 2000, 
maintaining the same share of EU total at 0.3% throughout the time period. EU 
exports progressed from ECU 1.487 million in 1993 through to ECU 2.052 
million in 1995 to Euro 3.229 million in 2000. Total EU share has also been 
maintained throughout the period at 0.3%52. This indicates very marginal 
industrial restructuring in the state as the host country export capacity vis-à-vis 
its largest trading partner has not increased during the pre-accession period. 
The recorded trade volumes appear rather to be resulting from the dissolution 
of closed trading in the Eastern block, making the EU naturally the dominant 
international trade partner for the country53. 
 
3.2. Accession negotiations: Phare 
Pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1266/1999, Article 4.2 amending 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89, establishing the PHARE programme, 
the latter financial instrument was restructured in 1999 in order to ‘focus on the 
main priorities for the adoption of the acquis communautaire, i.e. building up 
the administrative and institutional capacities of the applicant States and 
investment, except for the type of investments financed in accordance with 
Regulations (EC) No 1267/1999 and (EC) No 1268/1999.’54 The purpose of 
PHARE was thus expanded in order to suit the demands of the accession 
                                                 
52
 Source: FiFo Ost Database 
53
 Tsamboulas, D. (1999): The Future of Trans-European Corridor Developments in Eastern Europe, 
International Conference Paper on European Transport Policy and Research: What Future?, Vienna 17-
18 May, 1999, pp. 14-ff.  
54
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1266/1999 
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process. However, the approach that centred on funding for specific projects 
remained unaltered. 
The volumes of Phare projects subscribed to Bulgaria in the area of Industrial 
Policy in the period 1999-2005 is on average three projects per annum, which 
is few. This is accounted for by the fact that the average length of each project 
is between 24 and 36 months, including the stages of contracting, tendering, 
subscribing, and disbursement (payment appropriations) of funds. This is far 
too long considering the constraints imposed on the state by the sheer speed of 
the process of European integration. Where the time-frame of accession is four 
to six years (six in the case of Bulgaria), seeing initial project outputs only after 
two to three years into the negotiations addresses inadequately the intensity of 
the restructuring process required. 
The attention of Phare focused overwhelmingly on three major industrial 
policies: (1) competition policy, (2) privatization and (3) the restructuring of 
state monopolies55. It targeted three lines of funding in the main, namely (1) the 
Bulgarian Post-Privatization Fund (BPPF), (2) acquis harmonization in 
competition policy, and (3) the energy sector. Only a small fraction of Phare 
assistance was devoted to technological progress, research and innovations in 
the state. The two projects that were run did so only as pilot schemes. The size 
of pre-accession aid is shown in subsequent tables 1 respectively spread over 
large, medium and small projects. The evidence shows that the overall volume 
                                                 
55 Reference: Commission Regular Reports on Bulgaria’s progress towards accession, 1999-2004 
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of the pre-accession facility is low as compared to the total cost of the 
country’s preparation for accession56. 
Table 1: Pre-accession project aid 
Year Title Sector Public policy 
investment 
Institution-
building 
investment 
       Large Projects    
2004 BG/016-711.11.04 SME/Competition MEUR 21.3 MEUR 1.6 
2005 BG017-586.04.01 Industrial zones MEUR 13.5 MEUR 1.0 
 Medium Projects    
1998 BG980502 BPPF57 MEUR 3.5 0 
2000 BG0004.01 Competition/QMS MEUR 4.8 MEUR 0.2 
2001 BG0102.01/02 SME/Technology MEUR 4.4 MEUR 0.3 
2005 BG/017-586.01.01 Energy/Acquis MEUR 3.075 MEUR 0.9 
 Small Projects    
2000 BG0003.01 Telecoms acquis MEUR 0.7 MEUR 1.75 
2000 BG00.03.03 Procurement acquis MEUR 0.3 MEUR 1.0 
2000 BG0003.04 Energy acquis MEUR 0.1 MEUR 1.0 
2003 BG004-937.02.03 Clusters MEUR 0.1 MEUR 0.5 
2004 BG/016-711.02.01 Competition acquis 0 MEUR 0.9 
2005 BG/017-353.02.03 Industrial policy acquis MEUR 1.818 MEUR 0.963 
 
Average annual financial assistance from Phare to Bulgaria is estimated at ca. 
MEUR 178 over the period 2000-200458, of which roughly 13% was devoted to 
industrial restructuring from 2000 to 2004, which in fact is 8% of total when 
spread over the entire period of pre-accession negotiations, 1999-2005. This is 
less than 0.14% of national GDP per annum. Pre-accession aid towards the 
development of export capacity in the industrial sector can be, therefore, 
                                                 
56
 Angelov (2001) 
57
 Bulgarian Post-Privatization Fund 
58 Source: Commission estimations, Commission Regular Reports on Bulgaria’s progress towards 
accession 2004, p. 7 
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considered negligible. It addressed inadequately the need to develop absorption 
capacity in the state in order to halt and reverse the dramatically widening trade 
deficit during the accession period. Of the projects listed the average absorption 
rate of funds stood at 46.5% of allocated financing. This led to the fact that to 
finance industrial restructuring, the state had to use the OPP method (‘out of 
pocket’ cost method) to implement earmarked reforms. Applying cost-benefit 
analysis, Table 2 shows an estimation of the direct effect on the net balance of 
payments for Bulgaria and on the fiscal position of the state (Table 3) at the 
close of accession negotiations. 
Table 2: Net Balance of Payments effect for Bulgaria, % GDP 
Share of GDP Current prices, % GDP (MEUR)  
Promotion of strategic behaviour 
(steelworks only) 
2.9% (410.405) 
Pre-accession aid (all sectors) 0.05% (7.217) 
Sustaining technologies (steelworks only) 0 
Systems of Innovation (all sectors) 0 
Clusters (all sectors) 0 
Net impact + 2.95% (417.72) 
Source: Bozhilova (2008). 
 
Table 3: Net Fiscal effect for Bulgaria, % GDP  
Share of GDP Current prices, % GDP (MEUR)  
Co-financing of EU programmes 0.13% (18.760) 
Expenditures relating to acquis 
harmonization 
1.75% of 5.56 billion or 0.69% (equivalent to 97.3 
million p.a.) 
State aid (all sectors): 0.52% (73.33) 
Disruptive technologies (steelworks only) 1.79% (250.8) 
Net fiscal effect - 3.14% (440.19) 
Source: Bozhilova (2008). 
 
The evidence in Tables 2 and 3 points to a number of interesting conclusions. 
First, it shows that an increase in the net balance of payments to compensate 
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the deterioration of the state’s actual fiscal position has not occurred during the 
pre-accession period. Second, the EU has pursued a policy of curbing state aid 
in accession states (Table 3), not only in order to ensure equal competitiveness 
for industries across the single European market, but also in order to relieve the 
deterioration of the state’s fiscal position arising from reform pressures in 
preparation of EU membership59. The overall effect of accession shows a 
stabilization of the industrial sector to the extent that it is brought in line with 
EU standards and norms (acquis). The state is thus considered to have 
completed the Copenhagen economic criteria of enlargement.  
In actual fact, this effect is aided in by two main factors. First, by the state 
addressing the Commission benchmarks for accession through the OPP cost 
method. Second, more successful second-generation reforms in the industrial 
sector in Bulgaria occurred in large part aided in by FDI capital inflows, which 
represent the indirect effect of the European integration of the state with annual 
share of the national economy rising to ca. 10% of GDP in 2005 through to ca. 
16% of GDP in 2008, the highest in CEE. 
                                                 
59
 A scenario where during critical periods of rising unemployment and falling domestic demand, 
indiscriminate recourse to state aid can lead to a necessary deterioration of the state’s fiscal position is 
described by the European Commission in ‘Communication from the Commission — Temporary 
Community framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial and 
economic crisis’, (2009/C 16/01) 
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4. Foreign Direct Investment 
4.1. FDI and Economic Development 
FDI is described as having a positive effect on the economic transition of states 
in the area of technology transfer for capacity development in the industrial 
sector60. The impact of FDI on the host economy can be recognised in any one 
of three ways: (1) by stimulating development in the country through GDP 
growth, export capacity growth and capital stock growth; (2) by improving the 
technical and know-how transfer in the host country; (3) by developing the 
infrastructure that is consistent with environmental standards61. There are 
countries within CEE, which attracted FDI already in the first decade of 
transition, whilst others achieved this only in the second decade. Different 
assessments of the impact of ‘early’ and ‘late’ FDI on productive assets exist. 
The proponents of the former have based their arguments around early 
observations of FDI flows to CEE62. They have noted that those were very 
much focused on the Czech Republic and Hungary and much less so - on the 
remainder of the CEECs. Against this background and given the already noted 
negligible direct effect of capital flows from the pre-accession financial 
facilities as compared to the demands of transition, their observation stands. 
However, they make further mention of determinants on FDI that contribute to 
a disparate concentration of investments across countries and regions. Scholars 
                                                 
60
 Campos, N. and Konishita, Y. (2002): Foreign Direct Investment as Technology Transferred: Some 
Panel Evidence from the Transition Economies, William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 
438 
61
 Grigorova, V. (2007): FDI in Industry in Bulgaria, BAS, Sofia, p. 29 
62
 Lankes, H-P. and Venables, A.J. (1996): Foreign Direct Investment in Economic Transition: the 
changing patterns of investments, Economics of Transition, Vol. 4 (2), pp. 331-347 
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have noted the role of geography, the size of GDP and inflation, all of which 
have influenced the choice of destination for investors63. Bulgaria falls in 
Europe’s geographic periphery, has low GDP and in the early years of the 
transition, had considerable inflation that was not reversed until as late as 1998 
(Table 4). The EBRD transition report of 1995 notes that Bulgaria ranks only 
ahead of Romania in terms of how advanced its transition is with 2.56 out of 
maximum 4 points (which many foreign investors incidentally correlate with 
risk assessment), and this index is likewise reflected in its attractiveness to 
investors. 
Table 4: Main economic indicators of Bulgaria, 2000-2005 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP growth, % 5.4 4.1 4.9 4.5 5.6 5.5 
Industrial output growth, % 4.6 2.2 4.6 15.0 18.1 16.4 
Inflation, % 10.3 7.4 5.8 2.3 4.1 6.5 
Exports (bn EUR) 5.3 5.7 6.1 6.7 8.0 9.5 
Imports (bn EUR) 7.1 8.1 8.4 9.6 11.6 14.7 
Source: Grigorova, V. (2007): FDI in Industry in Bulgaria, BAS, Sofia, p. 64. 
 
A study by Iammarino and Pitelis on Greek FDI in Bulgaria and Romania 
explains the incidence of its concentration in the two Balkan states as flows 
from a peripheral EU economy to less favoured regions (LFRs)64. The evidence 
focuses on the effect of investments both for the host/home country analysis, as 
well as the effect for the EU integration of LFRs and conversely the impact of 
                                                 
63
 Ibid., p. 334 
64
 Iammarino, S and Pitelis, C. (1999): Foreign Direct Investment and Less Favoured Regions: Greek 
FDI in Bulgaria and Romania, ERSA Conference Paper Aug. 1999  
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those on the state of the Union. A unifying feature that the authors identify 
between Greece, Bulgaria and Romania is the fact that they all befit the 
category of EU LFRs.  
Yet, this explanation alone appears deficient. Total volumes of Greek FDI to 
the growth markets in South-East Europe indicate that it is a far more 
sophisticated economy than Bulgaria and Romania65. Thus, Greek companies 
could have chosen as investment destination any of the other CEE growth 
markets. Moreover, Greek FDI flows to Turkey and the Western Balkans are 
also significant over the same period, yet those countries were not yet EU 
accession candidates. Adding to the Iammarino and Pitelis centre-periphery 
explanation, this paper proposes the formation of stronger intra-regional ties 
within traditional regional trade blocks66.  
The idea of regional trade blocks is not an idea instead of multilateralism but 
rather post-1990, an idea in addition to multilateralism, so that we have both 
multilateral trade agreements (GATT) but also preferential trade agreements 
(EU). Within regions of preferential trade agreements we also observe the 
gradual formation of regional centres or ‘neighbourhoods’ based on the 
effectiveness and utility of bilateral trade relations. In effect, we observe a 
three-tier trade system made of (1) multilateral agreements, (2) regional trading 
                                                 
65
 Stoian, C. and Filippaios, F. (2008): Foreign Direct Investment in Central, Eastern and South Eastern 
Europe: an 'eclectic' approach to Greek investments, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation Management, Vol. 8, No. 5, pp. 542-564, p. 553 
66
 Reardon, J., Kling, N., McCorkle, J.E. and Miller, C. (2002): The formation of regional trade blocks: 
A theoretical perspective using game theory, American Business Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 91-99  
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blocks and (3) regional trading neighbourhoods67. The stronger dynamic of 
trade between Greece and Bulgaria, as well as between Greece and other of the 
states in SEE, such as Romania, Turkey and the Western Balkans, as opposed 
to the CEE region is better explained from this perspective than from the strict 
perspective of a centre-periphery hypothesis alone. In turn, it should seem 
logical that for non-EU members that are also transitional economies, such as 
Bulgaria in 1990, regional FDI from neighbouring states should be more 
significant in the first instances. At a second stage FDI from the wider regional 
trading block and from multilateral partners is attracted. This explains why in 
the case of Bulgaria the largest volume of FDI in the pre-accession period has 
come from Greek investors (1996-2003)68. This was followed on by a 
substantial additional investment from the EU more generally as accession 
negotiations progressed significantly (2003-2008) and was complimented by 
FDI from ROW as the certainty of accession increased (2004-2008). All along, 
the immediate regional FDI effect has not lost its significance, continuing to aid 
in the industrial restructuring and general economic development of the host 
country69. 
4.2. Greek FDI in Bulgaria 
A number of benefits accrue to the host state from FDI. A firm embodies 
labour, capital, technology, and accumulated management expertise and 
marketing skills, and when it invests abroad, it transfers many of these 
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 Also supported by the Inter-Balkan Cooperation, the BSECO and the Tripartite Initiative.  
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 Cr.-ref. section 1, p. 6-ff., this article  
69
 Monastiriotis, V. (2008): Quo Vadis Southeast Europe? EU Accession, Regional Cooperation and 
the need for a Balkan Development Strategy, GreeSE Paper Series, No. 10 
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components to its affiliate. Another benefit is set in the ability of an enterprise 
to channel its various outputs in the host country through its affiliate network, 
impacting positively on the host country’s trade balance albeit this effect is 
differentiated according to the type of FDI70. In this way, the goods produced in 
the host country are distributed to markets elsewhere.  
In addition to such obvious advantages FDI has a ‘dynamic’ component. This 
arises from the international rivalry of firms:  
The entry of a foreign investor into a market can pose a competitive 
challenge to local firms or to existing investors. For firms producing 
goods and services which cannot be traded internationally owing to their 
intangibility or prohibitive transport costs, FDI is the only mechanism 
for international competition. 71  
This is an assessment particularly true of economies in transition that have not 
yet been partly or fully integrated into a regional trade block. Then, FDI from a 
neighbouring state, that is however already fully integrated and operates a more 
sophisticated economy, can provide such much needed transfers and channels 
of affiliate networks to help in the restructuring and thereby, the integration of 
the host country by creating absorptive capacities. 
If we compare the results in Figure 1 and 2, we can see that there is a clear 
correlation between GDP growth and FDI flows. GDP growth is accompanied 
by surges in FDI and conversely, GDP contraction is accompanied by a 
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71
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withdrawal of FDI. There are more many factors that contribute to both events 
but since this study only looks at the structure of GDP as related to FDI, the 
analysis is constrained within those parameters. 
Figure 1: Real GDP growth in Bulgaria, 1999-2010, % 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2009; IMF, 2009. 
 
 
Figure 2: Share of FDI in % of GDP, 1998-2009 
 
Source: Bulgarian National Bank, National Statistical Institute, Ministry of the Economy, Greek 
National Statistical Service. 
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Table 5: Distribution of FDI by sectors of the economy, 1992-199772 
Sector of the economy Number of deals FDI, % of total GDP 
Industry 499 47.84 
Construction 97 1.25 
Transport 157 6.71 
Telecommunications 19 18.6 
Trade 45 7.36 
Tourism 45 7.36 
Finance 146 12.75 
 
Table 6: FDI flows in Bulgaria, 1998-2008, by industry, EUR million 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total 605.1 866.0 1103.3 903.4 980.0 1850.5 2735.9 3152.1 6158.4 8487.9 6163.0 
Agriculture 7.8 2.2 0.0 0.8 1.9 2.4 5.6 9.5 27.8 75.2 51.5 
Construction 2.9 21.5 29.2 19.6 36.5 5.0 81.7 171.6 501.0 797.4 465.0 
Education -0.1 -0.3 1.7 4.9 4.7 2.6 0.0 -0.6 0.1 0.8 0.4 
Electricity, gas 
and water 
supply 
2.0 -4.9 -15.6 3.1 73.3 7.7 670.8 308.5 352.4 332.5 176.2 
Financial 
intermediation 
168.7 103.0 17.7 137.6 135.7 432.5 236.1 667.3 799.4 2112.5 1485.9 
Fishing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 
Health and 
social work 
-0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.4 1.2 0.8 4.6 1.1 
Hotels and 
restaurants 
18.4 22.2 10.7 18.8 8.6 24.8 26.3 52.4 103.2 163.7 53.0 
Manufacturing 220.9 460.6 551.9 293.8 89.3 523.3 435.7 868.2 1064.7 906.2 810.0 
Mining 0.0 -0.3 6.4 5.4 11.3 18.7 17.5 36.3 21.4 5.3 7.6 
Other services 0.6 -0.7 17.2 5.7 32.0 22.3 7.5 19.5 65.3 89.9 30.9 
Real estate and 
activities 
38.0 42.6 146.0 13.4 67.2 169.1 215.6 533.8 1778.0 2505.1 1900.3 
Transport and 
Communication 
16.8 17.5 20.1 243.3 230.9 153.7 426.5 -108.7 447.7 89.3 214.1 
Wholesale and 
retail trade 
127.5 142.2 283.9 130.6 261.9 439.9 496.5 576.9 964.5 1237.4 796.9 
Non-classified 1.8 60.8 34.0 26.6 26.4 48.6 113.0 16.2 32.2 167.7 169.0 
Source: Bulgarian National Bank, 2009. Note: * Preliminary Data. 
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If we look at industry within the structure of GDP, then Table 5 shows that 
during the pre-accession period the bulk of FDI flows targeted the industrial 
sector, followed on by telecommunications and finance, whilst the construction 
sector attracted far less attention from investors. 
After the start of EU accession negotiations in 1999, manufacturing continued 
to receive strong attention but this was now on par with finance, whereas the 
construction sector was picking up quickly. Investments in real estate, above all 
others, took a clear precedence during the same period. When the evidence for 
the accession period in Table 6 is taken into consideration together with the 
evidence of FDI investments in Table 5 for the pre-accession period, industry 
emerges as one of the most dynamic sectors post-2000 (Figure 3; Table 4).  
Figure 3: Growth by sector, %, 2000-2007. 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Bulgaria. 
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Table 7 shows the investment sector break-down for the period 1998-2005. The 
evidence shows that during the period 1998-2005, investments in industry have 
increased three-fold. A significant part of the increase in accounted for by the 
manufacturing and construction sector. 
Table 7: Structure of investments in Bulgaria, 1998-2005, million BGN73  
Sector/Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Industry 1530.2 1929.9 2322.7 2599.5 2949.3 3638.9 4059.9 4255.0 
Mining 109.6 120.1 115.6 103.2 115.1 119.7 157.2 287.9 
Manufacturing 919.0 876.7 1290.6 1549.3 1921.0 2004.1 2086.4 2186.9 
Electricity, gas and water 
supply 
260.0 615.3 573.4 527.7 503.3 1024.3 1053.7 918.6 
Construction 241.6 317.8 343.1 419.3 409.9 490.8 762.6 861.6 
Agriculture 107.0 103.1 110.8 146.3 204.8 267.5 376.3 309.1 
Services 1751.0 2061.7 2976.0 3948.5 4066.4 4596.7 5513.4 5831.3 
Total 3388.2 4094.7 5409.4 6694.3 7220.5 8503.1 9949.6 10395.4 
Source: National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria / Grigorova, V. (2007): FDI in Industry in 
Bulgaria, Sofia, BAS, p. 78. 
 
The greater the number of long-term non-speculative investments, the stronger 
the foundations of productive assets in the national economy. In turn, this 
strengthens the ability of the state to generate absorptive capacities. A measure 
of this is often the rate of labour productivity growth as correlation of value 
added in the national economy per annum and the rate of employment74. Table 
8 shows that during the period 1998-2005, labour productivity growth in 
Bulgaria was modest while remaining the lowest amongst the CEECs. 
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Table 8: Labour productivity, CEE region, by country, 1998-2005 (EU-25=100) 
Year / 
Country 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Bulgaria 28.5 29.5 31.3 32.5 32.5 31.9 31.9 32.7 
Poland 46.2 49.1 51.3 50.3 51.5 59.6 62.0 61.9 
Romania 28.0 28.8 27.9 29.8 32.0 34.0 36.3 37.1 
Slovakia 50.2 51.8 54.5 55.9 58.9 58.9 60.3 61.9 
Slovenia 68.2 70.1 69.7 71.2 70.9 72.4 75.1 76.6 
Hungary 59.6 59.4 60.5 64.1 66.6 66.8 68.1 70.1 
Czech Republic 56.0 58.5 58.5 59.6 59.9 62.0 64.3 68.6 
Source: Eurostat, 2007. 
The evidence suggests that neither the size of the pre-accession financial 
facilities for Bulgaria, nor the FDI concentration by sector created sufficient 
absorption capacities in the national economy. Figure 4 and 5 further show that 
the majority investments and FDI inflows are concentrated in the non-industrial 
sector, creating circumstances for more many short-term speculative 
investments than industrial sector investments would have otherwise provided 
for. 
Figure 4: Structure of investments in Bulgaria, 1998-2005, by sector, % 
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The increase in investments is in large part accounted for by an increase in FDI 
flows, as shown in Table 6. Approximately two-thirds of total FDI inflows 
were in the services sector of the national economy (Figure 5). It is more 
lucrative with higher returns and a faster rate of return on investment. The 
remaining one-third of FDI inflows have occurred primarily in the industrial 
sector, mainly in the manufacturing and construction sector. This distinction 
draws on an anticipated effect of investments for the host economy at large. 
Speculative investments are related to short-term capital flows. In certain cases, 
they have even the potential to be harmful to the economy, such as under 
circumstances of a global financial crisis with restricted bank lending. Non-
speculative investments relate to long-term investment commitments that 
usually bear some strategic characteristics, such as in the manufacturing 
industry, construction, and some finance. 
Figure 5: Structure of FDI flows in Bulgaria, 1998-2005, by sector, % 
 
Source: Grigorova, V. (2007): FDI in Industry in Bulgaria, Sofia, BAS, p. 100. 
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Within the discussion of long-term non-speculative investments in the 
Bulgarian economy, the role of Greek FDI is important. Greece was the main 
country of FDI origin in 1996-2003. It is overall the third-largest foreign direct 
investor in Bulgaria over the period 1996-2008 with a 9.3%75 of total FDI stock 
share (Table 9) while in some sectors, such as banking, this is rising to over 
23% of FDI stock76.  
Table 9: Greek FDI flows in Bulgaria, EUR million, 1998-2008 
Year MEUR Increase y/y, MEUR 
1998 22.7 - 
1999 2.3 -20.4 
2000 105.8 103.5 
2001 262.3 156.5 
2002 240.1 -22.2 
2003 198.9 -41.2 
2004 179.6 -19.3 
2005 324.2 145 
2006 533.7 209.5 
2007 801.1 267.4 
2008 392.3 408.8 
Total 3063.0  
 
Amongst the long-term Greek FDI are investments in steelworks and other 
non-ferrous metals by Sidenor SA/Viohalco SA for Stomana Industries SA and 
Steelmet AD, respectively (7.32% of total Greek FDI). OTE/Globul and 
Intracom Holdings are strategic investors in the telecommunications market 
with a share of some 48% of total FDI stock (43.27% of total Greek FDI stock). 
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Other large non-speculative investments in light and heavy industry include 
Delta Dairy, Chipita, Coca-Cola HBC Bulgaria, Best Foods (food and 
beverages, 7% of total Greek FDI stock), Thrace paper mill (other processing, 
7% of total Greek FDI stock), the Public Corporation of Greece (coal and 
mining), Titan SA (cement). A spread of FDI stock by sectors is shown in 
Figure 6.  
Figure 6: Structure of Greek FDI stock in Bulgaria, by sector, % 
 
 
Figure 6 shows that almost two-thirds of total FDI stock is for long-term non-
speculative, non-service sector investments, creating significant export 
capacities in the host country. Data from the bilateral trade turn-over further 
supports this claim.  Greece has become Bulgaria’s third-largest trading 
partner, whilst Bulgaria, the fourth-largest trading partner of Greece77. In 2006, 
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6.9% of total Greek exports went to Bulgaria (up from 6.3% in 2004). Imports 
from Bulgaria represented 1.6% of total Greek imports. Conversely, imports 
from Greece represented 4.9% of total imports (down from 5.7% in 2004) 
while exports to Greece represented 8.9% of total exports. These indices have 
continued to rise through to 2008. A possible external explanation for this (in 
addition to domestic policy-making devised to attract FDI) is the creation of 
export capacity through FDI in the host country’s industrial sector. Over the 
period 1998-2008, of total EUR 3063 million of Greek FDI stock to Bulgaria, it 
is estimated that ca. 66% were made in industry (including 
telecommunications, or 25% excluding telecommunications)78. This is 
equivalent to some EUR 2083 million in total or EUR 766 million (excluding 
telecoms) in net FDI flows to the host country for long-term capital 
investments. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This article discusses the dynamic between European integration and foreign 
direct investment in the industrial sector of Bulgaria, and the extent to which 
they have aided in the economic transition of the country. It took in turn into 
consideration the impact of financial instruments driven by the EU pre-
accession and integration process, namely PHARE, the Europe Agreements and 
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Phare, as well as the influence of what is considered an indirect impact of the 
EU accession process, FDI to the host country.  
The analysis establishes a general relationship between European integration 
and FDI whereby the latter can be seen as incentivised by the progress of the 
former in the candidate state. The analysis also points out to exceptions to this 
pattern. Greek FDI appears to have followed both a European integration logic 
but also, critically, a logic of regional trade and cooperation as soon as growth 
opportunities arose in the transition market of its neighbouring state.  
The direct effect of accession negotiations up to the state’s accession has been 
weak, in some instances even negative. The indirect effect of the accession 
process, seen in the total volumes of FDI stock to the host country, has been 
more substantial. However, spread across sectors of the economy, it is clear 
that FDI to the industrial sector has received much less attention than the 
services sector, chief amongst which the real estate market and financial 
intermediation. In turn, FDI has impacted the creation of absorptive capacity 
for technology in the host economy modestly as evidenced by the comparative 
labour productivity growth index. 
Notwithstanding the slow pace of economic progress in Bulgaria, Greek FDI 
has proven a significant source of investments in industry (both light and 
heavy). Nearly two-thirds of Greek FDI stock comprises long-term, non-
speculative investments. This is markedly different from the general FDI stock 
pattern in Bulgaria where over 64% of investments have targeted the services 
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sector. In turn, regional trade between Bulgaria and Greece has recorded 
historical heights, even if there is still much potential to be spoken of. 
Importantly, the host country’s export trade volumes vis-à-vis the investments 
geographic origin has grown in direct correlation. This had practical 
implications for the European integration of Bulgaria, too. With the advent of 
the EU accession of Bulgaria (and Romania) in 2007, the region of South-East 
Europe has generated renewed interest amongst foreign investors as a potential 
growth market with low political risk and significant economic stabilisation, 
indicating a generally positive impact of the process of European integration 
and FDI inflows on transition countries. 
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